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2 3 23 O	 Abstract 
Some of the more significant accomplishments 
of recent years relating to the improvement of 
instruments, the measurement and compensation of 
the errors of static-pressure systems, and the col-
lection of information on the flight technical 
error are reviewed. Previous .studies of the rela-
tion between altimetry errors and vertical separa-
tion standards are discussed and the problem of 
assessing vertical separation standards is examined 
from an approach different from that used in those 
studies. On the basis of the present review, the 
need for further work is indicated for standard-
izing the calibrations of static-pressure systems, 
for collecting additional information on the flight 
technical error, for developing an altitude-
deviation monitoring and warning device, and for 
improving the maintenance practices relating to the 
testing and installation of the instruments. . 
Introduction 
A knowledge of the altimetry errors that 
determine the degree to which aircraft adhere to 
their assigned altitudes is needed for assessments 
of the adequacy of vertical separation standards. 
For cruise or holding flight, the extent to which 
an airplane deviates from its assigned altitude 
depends on the system error (combined instrument 
and static-pressure errors) and on the flight tech-
nical error (random deviations of the airplane from 
its cruise flight level). See figure 1. 
For a great many years extensive efforts have 
been made by manufacturers, operators, and govern-
ment agencies to improve the accuracy of instru-
ments and static-pressure systems and to collect 
data on the flight technical error. In addition, 
analytical studies have been conducted by several 
organizations - notably ICAO (International Civil 
Aviation Organization) and IATA (International Air 
Transport Association) - to estimate the altimetry 
error (combined system and flight technical errors) 
for an evaluation of vertical separation standards 
(refs. 1 to ii.). 
In the present paper, some of the more impor-
tant developments relating to the instrument, 
static-pressure and flight technical errors will be 
reviewed and the problem of assessing separation 
standards will be examined by an approach different 
from that used in other studies. 
Glossary of Terms 
Instrument error - statistical sum of the errors 
due to the mechanical imperfection of the altim-
eter (i.e., scale or diaphragm, hysteresis, drift, 
friction, temperature, instability, and backlash) 
and the errors due to readability (altitude and 
barometric-setting scales).
Static-pressure error - the difference between 
free-stream static pressure and the pressure reg-
istered by the aircraft static-pressure source 
(static-pressure tube or fuselage vent) for a 
given airplane, the statistical sum of the fixed. 
error (the error applicable to the aircraft type) 
and the variable error (the probable departure of 
the actual error from the fixed error). 
Flight technical error - random deviations of an 
airplane from its cruise flight level. 
System error - statistical sum of the instrument 
error and the static-pressure error. 
Altimetry error - statistical sum of the system 
error and the flight technical error. 
a - standard deviation of an error. 
3a - probable maximum value of an error or the
value having a probability of 99.7 percent. 
Instrument Errors 
Significant reductions in the instrument 
errors have been achieved through improvements in 
the design of the instruments and the test equip-
ment used to calibrate the instruments. 
Improved instrument design led to the develop-
ment of the "precision" altimeter (refs. 5 and 6) 
having low hysteresis and a high degree of repeat-
ability (ref. 7) and, in addition, scale (or dia-
phragm) errors which are less than one-half those 
of the older "sensitive" altimeter (refs. 8 and 9). 
Further reductions in the scale errors of the pre-
cision altimeter have been made possible by the 
development scale-error correction devices 
(ref. 10). As an indication of the extent to which 
the instruments have been improved, the instrument 
error of a precision altimeter with scale-error 
correction was estimated in reference 1 to be 
132 feet at 140,000 feet as compared to 663 feet for 
the sensitive altimeter without scale-error correc-
tion. Note that these figures are 3a values 
where a is the standard deviation of the errors. 
Improvements in the calibration test equipment 
have produced a variety of precision barometers and 
manometers that permit calibrations to be performed 
to an accuracy of 0.005 inch of mercury or 5 feet 
at sea level (refs. U and 12). For the rcrttine 
testing and adjustment of altimeters, howe.-r, this 
accuracy is not always realized in practice. In a 
recent survey of test equipment in control towers 
and instrument repair shops, for example, it was 
found that many control towers work to a tolerance 
of only 0.02 inch of mercury and that only 7 of the 
37 barometers tested in the repair shops conformed 
to a tolerance of 0.005 inch of mercury (ref. 13). 
This survey also disclosed other deficiences in the
test equipment and a lack of standardization in the 
laboratory test procedures. in two surveys of 
scale-error tolerances and installation errors of 
altimeters in operational use, deficiencies relating 
to the installation and maintenance of the instru-
ments were also uncovered (refs. 14 and 15). On 
the basis of these surveys, it would appear that 
further efforts are required to bring the competence 
level of instrument maintenance practices up to that 
which has been achieved in the development of the 
instruments and test equipment. 
Static-Pressure Errors 
The static-pressure error of an airplane is 
considered by ICAO and IATA as comprising a fixed 
error (the error applying to the aircraft type) and 
a variableerror (the probable departure of the 
actual error of the airplane from the fixed error). 
The variable error is considered to be a composite 
error that results from differences in the errors 
among aircraft of a type, the errors of the calibra-
tion procedure, and the change in the error during 
the service life of the airplane. 
The Fixed Error
and to remain at 250 feet for altitudes up to 
50,000 feet. 
In an early investigation to determine the 
variable error for a variety of civil and military 
aircraft, 96 airplanes representing 31 types were 
calibrated with pacer aircraft as the calibration 
reference (ref. 20). The results indicated that at 
altitudes of 10,000 and 15,000 feet, the differ-
ences in the static-pressure errors among airplanes 
of a type were within 100 feet for 22 types, 
between 100 and 200 feet for 8 types, and greater 
than 200 feet for 1 type. -For most of the aircraft 
types, therefore, the variable errors were within 
the ICAO estimates (130 feet at 10,000 feet and 
150 feet at 15,000 feet). 
In more recent tests of 16 military transports 
representing three aircraft types (ref. 21), the 
variable errors, as determined by a ground-camera 
technique, were found to be 35 feet at 10,000 feet 
for one type aircraft, 165 feet at 18,000 feet for 
a second type, and 105 feet at 35,000 feet for a 
third. type. Since the six airplanes for which the 
105-foot error was determined were all compara-
tively new, the variable error for older airplanes 
of the same type would be expected to be larger; 
the 250-foot value estimated by ICAO for an alti-
tude of 35,000 feet would, therefore, appear 
reasonable. 
In another recent investigation of the vari-
able error in France (ref. 22), the results of 
tests of the first 30 airplanes of a type also con-
firmed the ICAO estimates. 
Calibration Methods 
Although estimates have been made of the rela-
tive accuracies of various methods for the calibra-
tion of static-pressure systems (ref. 23), compara-
tive data on the experimental accuracy of the 
methods currently being used are lacking. Both 
ICAO and IATA have, therefore, expressed the need 
for a universal method to which the calibration of 
all aircraft could be referenced; a requirement was 
also stated that the method be simple enough for 
routine or periodic calibration checks. 
During the latter part of 1962, the FAA and 
the NASA selected and conducted a flight evaluation 
of a calibration method that appeared to best meet 
the requirements of accuracy and reproducibility 
demanded of a primary standard. This method com-
prised two test procedures, namely, a ground.. 
camera technique for calibrations at low altitudes 
and a ground-radar technique for calibrations at 
high altitudes. To determine the accuracy that 
could be achieved with these techniques, calibra-
tions of a jet transport were conducted using the 
most precise instrumentation available (ref. 24). 
For a given aircraft configuration, the magni-
tude of the fixed error depends on the design and 
location of the static-pressure sensor (fuselage 
vent or boom-mounted static-pressure tube) and on 
Mach number and angle of attack. For fixed errors 
exceeding 50 feet, both ICAO and IATA recommend 
that corrections be applied. If the corrections are 
applied with calibration cards, the residual error 
is estimated to be 15 feet for piston-engine air-
craft and 50 feet for jet aircraft; if the correc-
tions are applied by servo-correction devices, the 
residual error is given as 15 feet (refs. 1 and 2). 
However, in view of the specified accuracy of 
present-day air data compensators (i.e., 0.2 percent 
of the altitude or, for example, 80 feet at 
40,OOO feet - ref. 16), the 15-foot value given in 
references 1 and 2 would appear to be overly 
optimistic. 
For operations in the lower subsonic speed 
range, the magnitude of the fixed error of many 
installations is either sufficiently small as to 
require no correction or the calibration is suffi-
ciently simple that corrections can be applied with 
calibration cards. For aircraft operating at high 
subsonic speeds, however, the variation of the error 
with Mach number and angle of attack is generally of 
such magnitude and complexity as to require correc-
tion by automatic means. For supersonic flight, the 
fixed error of a fuselage-nose installation will be 
smaller than that of any other conventional instal-
lation (ref. 17). However, as noted in refer-
ence 18, even though the error of this installation 
may be small in terms of pressure, the corresponding 
error in terms of altitude will probably be of such 
magnitude as to require compensation. In a recent 	 From the results of two flights at heights of 
calibration of a fuselage-nose installation on the 	 about 500 feet and two flights at heights of about 
X-15 airplane, for example, the static-pressure 	 25,000 feet, the standard deviation (cs) of the data 
error at a Mach number of 3.1 was found to be only 	 from both the low- and the high-altitude tests was 
3/4 percent of the impact pressure but the corre- 	 found to be about 1/3 pound per square foot. The 
sponding altitude error was 2,200 feet (ref. 19).
	
	 altitude errors corresponding to this pressure 
error are 4 feet at sea level and 10 feet at 
25,000 feet. For these values of	 and for the
test airspeeds for which eight data points were 
obtained, the mean of the calibration is known, for 
acoflfidence level of 99 percent, to be within 
5fet at sea 1 el and 13 feet at 25,000 feet. 
r 
The Variable Error 
The magnitude of the variable error for current 
aircraft was estimated by ICAO to increase from 
110 feet at 5,000 feet to 250 feet at 30,000 feet
2.
On the basis of these results, the instrumen-
tation and techniques used in this investigation 
are considered suitable for use as a primary stand-
ard. However, because the method is expensive as 
regards radar cost and flight time per data point, 
there is a need for a simpler, less expensive method 
for conducting routine calibration checks. Although 
the ground-camera technique can 'be used for such 
check calibrations (as was done in the investigation 
of ref. 21), the method is not considered suffi-
ciently simple and flexible for use by aircraft 
operators. Other methods are, therefore, being 
evaluated by the FAA in an attempt to find, an 
acceptable method that can be used through a wide 
range of speed and altitude and still provide the 
precision required of a secondary standard. 
Flight Technical Errors 
For flight under autopilot control, the flight 
technical error was considered by. IATA to depend on 
the type of aircraft, the accuracy of the autopilot, 
and atmospheric conditions (ref. 2). 
On the basis of a number of investigations of 
the flight technical errors of civil aircraft at 
altitudesup to 25,000 feet, ICAO concluded that the 
errors were normally distributed and that ,a value of 
500 feet could be assigned as a probable maximum 
value for civil operations at altitudes up to 
50,000 feet. Since it was felt that this figure 
could be reduced by greater use of autopilots with 
height lock, an objective was stated for reducing 
the error to values that would range from 200 feet 
at 5,000 feet to 325 feet at 50,000 feet. 
During the past year, the NASA reported an 
investigation of the flight technical errors of 
commercial transports operating under autopilot, 
altitude-hold control at altitudes up to 40,000 feet 
(ref. 25). The data were obtained from 19 airplanes 
(including turbojet, turboprop, and piston-engine 
types) on 6,421 flights over 4 variety of routes 
including transoceanic. The errors were determined 
from pressure-altitude recordings which were evalu-
ated in terms of the percent of the cruise time the 
airplanes flew at given altitude deviations from 
their cruise flight levels. 
The altitude deviations for 0.3-percent cruise 
time (a criterion suggested by the 99.7-percent 
probability of the 3a value of a normal distribu-
tion) of the 19 airplanes are shown on figure 2 for 
each of the 5,000-foot-altitude brackets within 
which the data were collected. This figure shows 
that' the maximum value throughout the 40,000-foot 
range is 250 feet and that, for most of the air-
planes, the values are appreciably lower than those 
proposed by ICAO as a desirable objective. 
An analysis of the distribution of the flight 
technical errors of reference 25 showed the errors 
to be random but not normally distributed. Because 
of the nature of these distributions 1 the altitude 
deviations at 0.3-percent cruise time do not always 
reflect the much larger deviations that were expe-
rienced by many of the airplanes. For example, 
although the altitude deviations for 0.3-percent 
cruise time of the ten turbojets operating between 
25,000 and 40,000 feet were 225 feet or lower, the 
maximum deviations recorded on nine of the airplanes 
were in excess of 500 feet; for four of the air-
planes the deviations were in excess of 1,000 feet. 
Furthermore, these relatively large deviations 
occurred more frequently than might be expected; for
example, for the 2,361 flights of the ten turbo-
jets, over 250 deviations greater than 300 feet 
were recorded. Because of the magnitude and fre-
quency of these large deviations, it would appear 
desirable to incorporate some form of altitude-
deviation monitoring device to alert the pilot 
whenever the deviation exceeded some specified 
value, for example, 250 feet. 
In view of the quantity of data collected in 
the NASA investigation, the altitude deviations 
determined from this study are considered to be 
representative of those to be expected for civil 
transports under autopilot altitude-hold control at 
altitudes up to 40,000 feet. Since the altitude 
deviations for military and general aviation air-
craft may differ from those of the civil transports, 
investigations of-altitude-keeping performance of 
these aircraft would be required before a complete 
assessment can be made of the flight technical 
error.
Combined Errors 
As noted earlier, the system error is the corn-
b,ned value of the instrument and static-pressure 
errors and the altimetry error is the combined 
value of' the system and flight technical errors. 
Because of the difficulty of measuring either of 
the combined errors under actual operating condi-
tions, attempts have been made to compute these 
errors by statistical procedures. 
In the calculation of combined errors by ICAO 
and IATA (refs. 1 and 2), each of the individual 
errors (instrument, static-pressure, and flight 
technical) was assigned a probable maximum value 
and a type of error distribution. The individual 
errors were then combined by the root-mean-square 
procedure to produce either a system error or an 
altimetry error for a single airplane. For an 
assessment of vertical separation standards, the 
altimetry errors of two airplanes were combined by 
the same procedure and the resultant error was con-
sidered to represent the loss in vertical separa-
tiori that would be equaled or exceeded 3 tines in 
1,000. 
System Error 
An investigation to determine the sum of the 
system errors of two aircraft under actual operating 
conditions was conducted by eleven airlines under 
the sponsorship of IATA in 1963 (ref. 26). The 
measurements were made during routine flights over 
the North Atlantic at altitudes above 29,000 feet. 
The sum of the errors was determined as the differ-
ence between the pressure-altitude separation and 
the actual height separation (as measured by radio 
altimeters) of any two aircraft operating within 
specified space and time limits (e.g., common lon-
gitude within navigational accuracy limits, lateral 
separation within 1/2 degree of latitude, vertical 
separation within 2,000 feet, and a time separation 
no greater than 1 hour). From 1,280 pairs of 
observations, the sum of the system errors of two 
aircraft was found to be normally distributed and 
to have a 3a value of 510 feet. The reliability 
of this value is, of course, dependent on the accu-
racies of the radio altimeters and on the degree of 
concurrency (in terms of both time and position) of 
the two pressure-altitude readings. 
For this 510-foot value for two aircraft, the 
sys c.em error for a single aircraft, computed by the
error-combining procedure used by ICAO and IATA, 
would be 360 feet. Since the flight measurements 
were obtained with both uncorrected and servo-
corrected precision altimeters, only a general com-
parison can be made between this flight value of 
360 feet and the estimates of system errors given 
in reference 1. For an altitude of 35,000 feet 
(the assumed average altitude for the flight data), 
the 3a value of the system error for a system 
incorporating an uncorrected precision altimeter 
was estimated in reference 1 to be 342 feet; for a 
servo-corrected system, the error was estimated to 
be 279 feet. 
Altimetry Errors 
In an assessment of vertical separation stand-
ards in 1960 (ref. 2), IATA concluded that 
1,000-foot separations were safe and acceptable up 
to 50,000 feet for aircraft equipped with precision 
altimeters or instruments with better performance. 
This conclusion was based on the assumption that the 
fixed static-pressure error would be corrected (by 
calibration card) to a residual error of 50 feet, 
that the probable maximum values of the variable 
static-pressure error would be those estimated by 
ICAO (for example, 250 feet for altitudes above 
30,000 feet), and that the flight technical error 
would have a probable maximum value of 500 feet. 
All of the errors were assumed to have a normal 
distribution except the residual error of the 
static-pressure correction, which was assumed to 
have a rectangular distribution. 
For an altitude of 40,000 feet, the instrument 
and static-pressure errors, according to the IATA 
estimate, are 249 and 264 feet, respectively. When 
these errors are combined with the' 500-foot flight 
technical error, the altimetry error for a single 
aircraft becomes 618 feet. For two aircraft, the 
statistical sum of the two altimetry errors would 
be 618 x
	
or 874 feet. Graphical representa-
tions of the distributions of these individual and 
combined errors are shown in figure 3a. If the 
874-foot value is considered as a measure of verti-
cal separation loss within an assigned separation 
of 1,000 feet (reduced by 50 feet to account for the 
vertical size of the aircraft), the actual separa-
tion would be 76 feet. 
In contrast to this procedure of computing 
vertical separation loss from a statistical summa-
tion of two altimetry errors, the altimetry errors 
of two aircraft can also be related to a given sep-
aration to provide another measure of operational 
safety, namely, collision probability. In ref-
erence 27 It was shown that, if the altimetry-error 
distributions of two aircraft can be represented by 
normal curves and if the two curves are separated by 
an amount equal to the assigned separation, then, if 
the aircraft are located along a vertical line, the 
probability of collision is determined by the extent 
to which the curves overlap and by the vertical 
dimensions of the aircraft. This procedure for cal-
culating collision probabilities is illustrated in 
figure 3b for the same set of values used in fig-
ure 3a (i.e., altimetry errors of 618 feet, aircraft 
dimensions of 50 feet, and an assigned separation of 
1,000 feet). For this case, the collision probabil-
ity was calculated to be 192/1,000,000. This, then, 
is the collision probability that would apply (along 
a vertical line) when the actual separation, cal-
culated by the vertical separation-loss procedure, 
is 76 feet.
To indicate the manner in which collision 
probability varies with altimetry error, additional 
calculations were made for the case of two aircraft 
having vertical dimensions of 50 feet and an 
assigned separation of 1,000 feet. The results of 
these' calculations are plotted in figure 4, which 
shows the collision probability to be near zero for 
altimetry errors up to 400 feet, to increase to 
10/1,000,000 at an altimetry error of 500 feet and 
to increase thereafter at a very rapid rate for 
altimetry errors greater than 500 feet. It should 
be emphasized that these values of collision proba-
bility are relative and that the actual probabili-
ties of collision would be lower if account could 
be taken of lateral and longitudinal separations. 
From a consideration of the flight technical 
errors determined In the NASA investigation (which 
showed the altitude deviations for 0.3-percent 
cruise time to be considerably lower than the 
500-foot value assumed in the IATA analysis), It 
might appear that altimetry errors of 500 feet or 
less can be realized with present-day equipment. 
To examine this possibility, calculations have 
been made of an altimetry error based on (1) a 
flight technical error of 225 feet (the highest 
value determined in the NASA investigation for the 
altitude range of 25,000 to 40,000 feet), (2) a 
servo-correction system error of 0.2-percent alti-
tude (assumed to have a normal distribution and to 
be applicable to both the instrument error and the 
fixed static-pressure error), and (3) the ICAO 
assumed value for the variable error of the static-
pressure system. For an altitude of 40,000 feet 
(for which the residual error of the servo-
correction system is 80 feet and the variable 
static-pressure error Is 250 feet), the system 
error would be 262 feet. 
Since the flight technical errors determined. 
in the NASA investigation were not normally distrib-
uted, they cannot be combined with the 3a value 
of a normally distributed system error by the sta-
tistical summation procedure used by ICAO and IATA. 
As an alternate, and more conservative, approach, 
the two errors have been added directly (as indi-
cated In fig. 5 for two aircraft having an assigned 
separation of 1,000 feet) to produce an altimetry 
error of 487 feet. 
Since the probability that the system error 
will be either plus or minus 262 feet is 1.5/1,000, 
the probability that the actual flight levels of 
the two airplanes will each be displaced by 262 feet 
and in directions to reduce separation is 
2/1,000,000. Similarly, since an altitude deviation 
of 225 feet either above or below the actual flight 
level would occur for 0.15 percent of the cruise 
time, deviations of 225 feet by both of the aircraft 
in directions to reduce the separation would occur 
for 0.0002 percent of the cruise times of the two 
aircraft. 
From a consideration of (1) the low probability 
of the two flight levels being displaced from the 
assigned altitudes by 262 feet in directions to 
reduce separation and (2) the low percent of their 
cruise times that the two aircraft would each devi-
ate by an additional 225 feet in directions to fur-
ther reduce the separation, it would appear that 
the collision exposure time for the two aircraft 
would be extremely small. The probability of a col-
lision occurrence, however, would be even smaller, 
4
since such a condition would require that the alti-
tude deviations 6f the two aircraft occur over the 
same point (i.e., with zero horizontal separation). 
On the assumption that these values for the 
system error and the flight technical error are 
truly representative of the operational accuracies 
that can be achieved with currently available 
instruments, autopilots, and aircraft, it would 
appear that a high degree of operational safety can 
be realized within 1,000-foot vertical separations 
at altitudes up to 40,000 feet. However, in view 
of the large excursions from flight level that were 
encountered when the altitude deviations for 
0.3-percent cruise time were 225 feet or less, it 
would appear that this degree of safety will be 
realized only if the aircraft are equipped with 
altitude-deviation warning devices to insure that 
the flight technical errors are kept within limits 
approximating the 225-foot value assumed in this 
analysis.
Need For Further Work 
From the foregoing review of altimetry devel-
opments, it Is apparent that significant progress 
has been made in recent years. However, the need 
for further efforts in some areas has also been 
indicated. 
With regard to static-pressure measurements, 
for example, there is a need to develop asiniple 
and precise calibration method and to establish an 
international standard to which the calibrations of 
all aircraft can be referenced. The development of 
such a method would provide more accurate correc-
tions for the static-pressure errors of individual 
aircraft and would permit the accumulation of infor-
mation on the variable error of the static-pressure 
systems of large numbers of aircraft. 
There is also a need for collecting data on 
the flight technical errors of military and general 
aviation aircraft. Because of the large altitude 
deviations which have been found to occur with air-
craft on autopilot altitude-hold control, a need 
for an altitude-deviation monitoring and warning 
device has also been indicated. 
Finally, there is a need to Improve the main-
tenance practices and to standardize the equipment 
and procedures relating to the routine testing and 
installation of the instruments. 
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